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Abstract. Skipjack is a block cipher designed by the NSA for use in US government phones,
and commercial mobile and wireless products by AT&T. Among its initial implementations in
hardware were the Clipper chip and Fortezza PC cards, which have since influenced the pri-
vate communications market to be compatible with this technology. For instance, the Fortezza
card comes in PCMCIA interface and is a very easy plug-n-play device to add on to mobile
and wireless systems to provide encryption for wireless transmissions. Initially classified when
it was first proposed, Skipjack was declassified in 1998 and sparked numerous security anal-
yses from security researchers worldwide because it provides insight into the state-of-the-art
security design techniques used by a highly secretive government intelligence agency such as
the NSA. In this paper, commemorating a decade since Skipjack’s public revelation, we revisit
the security of Skipjack, in particular its resistance to advanced differential-style distinguish-
ers. In contrast to previous work that considered conventional and impossible differential
distinguishers, we concentrate our attention on the more recent advanced differential-style
and related-key distinguishers that were most likely not considered in the original design
objectives of the NSA. In particular, we construct first-known related-key impossible differ-
ential, rectangle and related-key rectangle distinguishers of Skipjack. Our related-key attacks
(i.e., related-key miss-in-the-middle and related-key rectangle attacks) are better than all the
previous related-key attacks on Skipjack. Finally, we characterize the strength of Skipjack
against all these attacks and motivate reasons why, influenced by the Skipjack structure,
some attacks fare better. What is intriguing about Skipjack is its simple key schedule and a
structure that is a cross between conventional Feistel design principles and the unconventional
use of different round types. This work complements past results on the security analysis of
Skipjack and is hoped to provide further insight into the security of an NSA-designed block
cipher; the only one publicly known to date.
Keywords: Block Ciphers, Skipjack, NSA, Distinguisher, Analysis, Related-Key Miss-in-the-Middle
Attacks, Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks.
1 Introduction
Skipjack [56] is a 64-bit symmetric-key block cipher designed by the US National Security Agency
(NSA). After Skipjack was designed, it was classified to be used in tamper-resistant Capstone and
Clipper chips for US government purposes, e.g., voice, mobile and wireless communcations. What
is intriguing about this cipher and what catches public attention to its design and analysis is that
it was designed by mathematicians within the NSA, an agency highly notorious for its secrecy and
the most advanced cipher design and analysis technology in the world. Moreover, the fact that it
was designed and finalized in 1990, more than a decade after DES, means that it is expected that
Skipjack be much more secure and resistant to known attacks. To allay initial public doubts [21,
62] of its security, a panel of 5 well-known cryptographers were asked to review its security [20] in
? The first author was supported by the Second Brain Korea 21 Project.
?? Part of this work done while the author was with the Laboratoire de se´curite´ et de cryptographie
(LASEC), Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland.
21993, and one of the conclusions made was:
“In summary, SKIPJACK is based on some of NSA’s best technology. Considerable care went into
its design and evaluation in accordance with the care given to algorithms that protect classified data.”
Skipjack was declassified in 1998 [56], and immediately triggered several cryptanalytic results
including [3, 4, 43]. In addition to the public speculation and distrust of Skipjack, the facts that it is
designed with “alien” encryption technology by NSA, that it was initially classified but later made
public, and that it consists of very simple round functions and a simple key schedule algorithm,
have intrigued cryptanalysts [3, 4, 24, 26, 27, 43, 44, 54, 55, 61].
1.1 Outline of This Paper
In this paper we revisit the design and structure of Skipjack with respect to resistance against
differential-style attacks. We particularly treat the existence of advanced differential-style distigu-
ishers that can be used to mount attacks on reduced-round Skipjack variants.
In Sect. 2.1 we present the related-key miss-in-the-middle (RK-MisM) attack [58] on block
ciphers as a natural related-key [1, 2, 59] counterpart of the conventional miss-in-the-middle (MisM)
attack [5]. This is useful to exploit two (often short) related-key differentials into a longer related-key
impossible differential that covers more rounds of the cipher. In general, whenever probability-one
related-key differentials exist through two round sequences of a cipher, then the RK-MisM can be
considered.
In Sect. 2.2 we unify all previous works on boomerang-style distinguishers [63, 32, 6, 57, 7, 8, 48,
37] and their related-key counterparts [36, 25, 38, 9, 10, 22, 53, 29, 35, 64, 46, 47, 49, 50, 23]. We high-
light their similarities and differences for a better view of which attack variant is more suitable for
a particular situation.
We also show for the first time1 how amplified boomerang and rectangle distinguishers can
be constructed by using only truncated differentials. Notice that all previous attacks [32, 39, 6–
8] have the restriction [45] that differentials for the first half of the cipher must be conventional
non-truncated types.
Sect. 3 is a brief one that describes Skipjack, the complementation properties of its G permu-
tation, and also points out flaws in previous differential attacks of Skipjack in [26].
We present in Sect. 4 and 5 the first-known related-key miss-in-the-middle, rectangle and related-
key rectangle distinguishers of Skipjack. Our rectangle attacks together with other attacks in [3, 44,
43, 26, 55] show that in the non-related-key setting, allowing the adversary to obtain sets of chosen
texts of cardinality greater than 2 offers no added advantage over obtaining sets of chosen texts
with cardinality 2 (a pair). In fact, conventional differential crypanalysis using pairs (cardinality 2)
of chosen texts suffices; indeed the current best attack [4] on Skipjack is of this type.
Furthermore, our related-key attacks are better than all the previous related-key attacks on
Skipjack [54, 55].
The best previous attack on Skipjack [4] was presented a decade ago, but since then no im-
provements have been reported and an attack on the full 32-round Skipjack remains elusive until
now. This work is intended to summarize previous attacks on Skipjack variants, and simultaneously
consider some further interesting properties and advanced distinguishers to provide more insight
into its structure, and motivate continued public analysis of the NSA’s design of Skipjack.
2 Advanced Differential-Style Attacks & Related-Key Counterparts
We discuss advanced differential-style distinguishers that make use of several short differentials
to form long ones such as the impossible differential and boomerang-style distinguishers, and also
discuss their related-key counterparts.
1 We developed initial ideas for truncated amplified boomerangs in 2001 [57].
32.1 The Miss-in-the-Middle Attack
The miss-in-the-middle attack (the term was coined by Biham et al. in [5]), was first applied by
Knudsen [42] to construct a 5-round impossible differential of the DEAL block cipher, which is a
Feistel cipher. This concept was later generalized by Biham et al. [5] as a generic construction to
build impossible differentials for ciphers of any structure. Consider a cipher E as a cascade, i.e.,
E = E1 ◦E0 such that for E0 there exists a differential (α→ β) and for E1 there exists a differential
(γ → δ), both with probability one, where β 6= γ. Both these are then used to form an impossible
differential distinguisher, using the miss-in-the-middle technique:2
– Chosen-Plaintext (CP) Query:
Obtain the encryption of a pair of plaintexts (P1, P2) such that P1 ⊕ P2 = α, and denote the
corresponding ciphertexts by (C1, C2).
– Check whether C1 ⊕ C2 = δ [Impossible Condition].
The impossible condition (α 6→ δ) happens because (α → β) always goes through E0 and (γ → δ)
always goes through E1 but since β 6= γ, thus (α→ δ) is impossible. A plaintext pair P1 ⊕P2 = α,
and corresponding ciphertext pair C1⊕C2 = δ would form an impossible differential distinguisher.
This was formed by a contradiction (miss) in the middle of the cipher, hence the name.
In practice, impossible differentials can be used by guessing their outer keys. That is, if the
guessed outer keys cause impossible differentials, then they are discarded since the right key never
cause impossible differentials.
Related-Key Miss-in-the-Middle Attack. The miss-in-the-middle attack is used to concate-
nate normal (non-related-key) differentials. It is natural to apply this technique to the related-key
setting. We first remark that related-key differentials are in fact very similar to normal differen-
tials. While the latter makes use of differences only in the input pair, the former uses differences
not only in the input pair but also in the key pair. Differences in the key pair subsequently cause
corresponding differences in the round-key pairs generated from the key pair. However, aside from
this, differentials basically trace a difference value as it propagates through the cipher. Therefore,
regardless of whether the difference comes from the input or from the key as well, we can treat
and analyze these differentials in the same way. Therefore, the related-key miss-in-the-middle (RK-
MisM) attack3 is a related-key counterpart of the normal miss-in-the-middle attack [5], and can
equally be applied to concatenate two probability-one related-key differentials such that they form
a contradiction in the middle. The concatenation of the two differentials results in a related-key
impossible differential.
2.2 The Boomerang, Amplified Boomerang and Rectangle Attacks
Wagner [63] considered a cipher E = E1 ◦ E0 such that for E0 (respectively E1) there exists a
differential (α → β) with probability p (respectively (γ → δ) with probability q). He then defined
the boomerang distinguisher as follows:
– Chosen-Plaintext (CP) Query:
Obtain ciphertexts (C1, C2) of a pair of plaintexts (P1, P2) such that P1 ⊕ P2 = α.
– Adaptively-Chosen Ciphertext (ACC) Query:
Calculate C3 = C1 ⊕ δ and C4 = C2 ⊕ δ, and obtain the decryption of the pair (C3, C4), thus
(P3, P4).
– Check whether P3 ⊕ P4 = α [Boomerang Condition].
The boomerang distinguisher uses the differential (α → β) to cover E0 in forward direction with
respect to the pairs (P1, P2) but in backward direction with respect to the pairs (P3, P4); and the
differential (γ → δ) to cover E1 in backward direction with respect to both (C1, C3) and (C2, C4).
2 Note that not all impossible differentials are necessarily constructed via the miss-in-the-middle technique
that uses two short differentials. Some other techniques include the shrinking technique [4], or simply
using just one long differential that never results in a certain output difference.
3 The idea of RK-MisM was independently introduced in [58] and [28]. Since then, it has also been used
in [11].
4The boomerang condition (P3 ⊕ P4 = α) happens because CP and ACC queries cause the
boomerang property to occur in the middle of the cipher E:
E0(P3)⊕ E0(P4) = E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2)⊕ E0(P1)⊕ E0(P3)⊕ E0(P2)⊕ E0(P4)
= (E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2))⊕ (E−11 (C1)⊕ E−11 (C3))⊕ (E−11 (C2)⊕ E−11 (C4))
= β ⊕ γ ⊕ γ = β.
This boomerang property holds with probability pq2 since E0(P1) ⊕ E0(P2) = β with probability
p and E−11 (C1) ⊕ E−11 (C3) = E−11 (C2) ⊕ E−11 (C4) = γ with probability q2. When this boomerang
property occurs, we then have P3 ⊕ P4 = α with probability p due to the differential (β → α)
through E−10 , and thus for the cipher E, the total probability of the boomerang distinguisher, i.e.,
the probability of satisfying the boomerang condition, is (pq)2. On the other hand, this boomerang
condition is satisfied with probability 2−n for a random permutation, where n is the block size.
Hence, if (pq)2 >> 2−n, then this distinguisher can be used to effectively distinguish E from a
random permutation.
In fact, the resultant probability of the boomerang distinguisher can be improved (see [63] Sect.
4) using all possible differentials for E0 and E1 such that β and γ are varied over all their possible
values (as long as β 6= γ), i.e., the intermediate differences β and γ do not have to be fixed to any
values, only α and δ need to be fixed. This refinement4 increases the total probability to (pˆqˆ)2, and
to align with current naming convention would be more rightly called the rectangled boomerang
distinguisher, where:
pˆ =
√∑
β
Pr2[α→ β], qˆ =
√∑
γ
Pr2[γ → δ]. (1)
One limitation of the boomerang is it requires adaptively-chosen ciphertexts, which works under
a more restricted security model compared to more common known- and chosen-text attacks. To
overcome this, Kelsey et al. [32] applied the birthday paradox technique by collecting many quartets
(P1, P2, P3, P4) such that the boomerang-style condition is satisfied for at least a few such quartets.
This was termed the amplified boomerang attack. The steps in constructing such a distinguisher
are:
– Chosen-Plaintext (CP) Query:
Obtain the encryption of a quartet of plaintexts (P1, P2, P3, P4) such that P1⊕P2 = P3⊕P4 = α,
and denote the corresponding ciphertexts by (C1, C2, C3, C4).
– Check whether C1 ⊕ C3 = C2 ⊕ C4 = δ [Amplified Boomerang Condition].
In this case, the amplified boomerang distinguisher uses the differential (α→ β) to cover E0 in the
forward direction with respect to both the pairs (P1, P2) and (P3, P4); and the differential (γ → δ)
to cover E1 in the forward direction with respect to both the pairs (C1, C3) and (C2, C4).
The amplified boomerang condition (C1 ⊕ C3 = C2 ⊕ C4 = δ) exists because when E0(P1) ⊕
E0(P3) = γ with some probability σ = 2−n, then the amplified boomerang property occurs in the
middle of the cipher E:
E0(P2)⊕ E0(P4) = (E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2))⊕ (E0(P3)⊕ E0(P4))⊕ (E0(P1)⊕ E0(P3))
= β ⊕ β ⊕ γ = γ.
This boomerang property holds with probability 2−n × p2 since E0(P1) ⊕ E0(P2) = E0(P3) ⊕
E0(P4) = β with probability p2 and E0(P1)⊕E0(P3) = γ with probability 2−n. When this amplified
boomerang property occurs, we then have C1 ⊕ C3 = C2 ⊕ C4 = δ with probability q2 due to the
differential (γ → δ) through E1, and thus for the cipher E, the total probability of the amplified
boomerang distinguisher, i.e., the probability of satisfying the amplified boomerang condition, is
2−n×(pq)2. Since this amplified boomerang condition is satisfied with probability 2−2n for a random
permutation, if (2−n × (pq)2) >> 2−2n, then this distinguisher effectively distinguishes E from a
random permutation.
Similarly, the resultant probability of the amplified boomerang distinguisher can be improved
[6] using all possible differentials for E0 and E1 such that β and γ are varied over all their possible
4 Later called “rectangling” by Biham et al. [6].
5values (as long as β 6= γ), i.e., the intermediate differences β and γ do not have to be fixed to any
values, only α and δ need to be fixed. This rectangling refinement originally described by Wagner
in [63] for the case of boomerang distinguishers, was adapted5 by Biham et al. [6] to the amplified
boomerang distinguisher case, and given the name “rectangle attack”. For much clearer comparison
with the original boomerang and amplified boomerang attacks, this would be more rightly called the
rectangled amplified boomerang attack. The rectangle distinguisher has an increased total probability
of 2−n × (pˆqˆ)2, where pˆ and qˆ are as previously defined in equation (1). (Note that the amplified
boomerang condition can be C1⊕C3 = C2⊕C4 = δ or C1⊕C4 = C2⊕C3 = δ, which allows to reduce
an attack complexity by a factor of 2.) However, the crypto community has grown accustomed to
the term “rectangle attacks” to mean either the original amplified boomerang attack in [32] or the
later rectangle attacks in [6], henceforth unless otherwise stated we will just use “rectangle attacks”
to refer to either one interchangibly.
Table 1 compares the differences between the boomerang attack variants. See Appendix C for
a list of all known work on boomerang-style attacks.
Table 1. Comparing the Boomerang Attack Variants
Attack Variant Differential Fixed Resultant Source
Directions Differences Probability
Boomerang E0, E1, E1, E
−1
0 α, β, γ, δ (pq)
2 [63]
Rectangled Boomerang E0, E1, E1, E
−1
0 α, δ (pˆqˆ)
2 [63]
Amplified Boomerang E0, E0, E1, E1 α, β, γ, δ 2
−n · (pq)2 [32]
Rectangled Amplified Boomerang E0, E0, E1, E1 α, δ 2
−n · (pˆqˆ)2 [6]
Extension: Using Only Truncated Differentials. Truncated differentials [41], unlike conven-
tional non-truncated differentials [12, 13], do not necessarily have the same probability when going
in reverse as when going forward. Thus when calculating the probability of a boomerang-style dis-
tinguisher based on the use of truncated differentials instead of non-truncated ones, more care is
needed.
This special consideration for boomerang distinguishers with only truncated differentials was con-
sidered by Wagner in [63] Sect. 6. The boomerang property in the middle of E may not work since
we are using truncated differences, where only a subset of w-bit (word) differences are fixed to ‘0’
while remaining word differences are arbitrary and unknown. Let p1 (respectively p2) be a proba-
bility of a truncated differential α → β for E0 (respectively β → α for E−10 ) and q1 (respectively
q2) be a probability of a truncated differential γ → δ for E1 (respectively δ → γ for E−11 ), where
α, β, γ and δ all are non-empty difference sets. Then E0(P1) ⊕ E0(P2) = β1 ∈ β with probability
p1, E−11 (C1) ⊕ E−11 (C3) = γ1 ∈ γ with probability q2 and E−11 (C2) ⊕ E−11 (C4) = γ2 ∈ γ with
probability q2 and the boomerang property occurs in the middle of the cipher E:
E0(P3)⊕ E0(P4) = E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2)⊕ E0(P1)⊕ E0(P3)⊕ E0(P2)⊕ E0(P4)
= (E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2))⊕ (E−11 (C1)⊕ E−11 (C3))⊕ (E−11 (C2)⊕ E−11 (C4))
= β1 ⊕ γ1 ⊕ γ2 = β2 ∈ β,
only if γ1⊕ γ2 = 0 [truncated restriction] occurs with some probability ρ in words corresponding to
zero word differences of β. Note that although the truncated differences β1, β2 (or γ1, γ2) are equal
in the zero word differences, they may have different values in the non-zero arbitrary words. We
call this the truncated boomerang distinguisher. Thus, the resultant probability of the boomerang
distinguisher becomes p1 · p2 · (q2)2 × ρ, where ρ = 2−(mβ−m′γ)×w, and mβ is the number of w-
bit zero word differences in β and m′γ is the number of w-bit zero word differences in γ which
5 To be clear, the first two improvements in [6] basically mean to count over all intermediate differences
β and γ, and was already pointed out in [63]. The third improvement in [6] allows to optimize the
probability of an amplified boomerang distinguisher, but it is very hard to do the exact calculation. Note
that further improved attack algorithms for boomerang and rectangle attacks were later suggested in [7].
6are in the positions of the zero word differences in β. The extra ρ factor is the effect of using
truncated differentials instead of conventional non-truncated ones. See [15] for another example of
how boomerang distinguishers of AES are constructed using only truncated differentials.
We now discuss how this applies to the amplified boomerang case. Although previous amplified
boomerang attacks [32, 39], rectangle attacks [6–8] and related-key rectangle attacks [36, 25, 9, 10]
have only used non-truncated differentials through the first half E0 of the cipher, the same special
truncated consideration applies when truncated differentials are used, and thus would be called the
truncated amplified boomerang distinguisher (initiated in our earlier work [57]). As far as we know,
using only truncated differentials to construct amplified boomerang distinguishers (and equally
rectangled boomerang distinguishers) has not yet been considered before by other researchers.
Here, the resultant probability of the truncated amplified boomerang distinguisher is σ×(p1q1)2×ρ,
where σ = 2−mγ×w < 2−n, ρ = 2−(mγ−m
′
β)×w, mγ is the number of w-bit zero word differences in
γ and m′β is the number of w-bit zero word differences in β which are in the positions of the zero
word differences in γ. In Sect. 5 we will demonstrate this by showing rectangle attacks using only
truncated differentials through both halves of the cipher.
Related-Key Variants. The related-key boomerang attack was considered in [9], while the
related-key rectangle (amplified boomerang) attack, first considered in [36] with 2 related keys,
was later extended in [25, 10] to work with 4 related keys and in [9] with 256 related keys. The
basic idea in [36] is to use either a conventional non-related-key differential or a related-key differ-
ential to cover E0, and both non-related-key and related-key differentials to cover E1. [25] used only
related-key differentials to cover both E0 and E1. Meanwhile, [9] similarly used only related-key
differentials to cover both E0 and E1, but they used structures of more related keys than [25],
resulting in a higher probability of generating the required related-key rectangles. Refer to [36, 25,
9, 10] for illustrative descriptions of these.
3 Skipjack
The 64-bit block of Skipjack is divided into four 16-bit words. Eight A rounds and eight B rounds
are alternated until full 32 rounds are achieved, and a constant round counter is used that is actually
the round number (in the range 1 to 32). The transformation G : {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}16 → {0, 1}16
consists of a 4-round Feistel structure whose internal function F : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8 is an 8 × 8
S-box (refer to Fig. 1 in Appendix A for the details of G).
The key schedule of Skipjack takes the 10-byte (80-bit) secret key, K ∈ {0, 1}80 and uses four
bytes at a time for the G transformation in each round. Let K = B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9B10
where Bi ∈ {0, 1}8 are the bytes of the key, K. Let RKi ∈ {0, 1}32 be the ith round key. Then
RKi = RKi mod 5 and specifically: RK1 = B1B2B3B4, RK2 = B5B6B7B8, RK3 = B9B10B1B2,
RK4 = B3B4B5B6 and RK5 = B7B8B9B10. After every 5 rounds, the cycle repeats, hence the key
schedule of Skipjack appears to have a periodicity of 5 rounds. Fortunately, this does not make it
susceptible to the slide attacks [18, 19] due to the different round types (A,B) used. See Fig. 2 in
Appendix A for A- and B-round of Skipjack.
3.1 Complementation Properties of the G Permutation
We describe the complementation properties of the G permutation within the round functions,
which are essential in our attacks on Skipjack. We first define the following:
– Iij : j-th 16-bit input value of the i-th round (j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 1, 2, · · · , 32).
– a: an arbitrary fixed nonzero 16-bit value (a 6= 0).
– bi: an arbitrary 16-bit value such that bi 6= a.
– ci: an arbitrary nonzero 16-bit value (ci 6= 0).
– di: an arbitrary 16-bit value.
– x: a 16-bit value (x2, x1), containing swapped halves of x = (x1, x2), where x1 and x2 are 8-bit
values.
7The G : {0, 1}32 × {0, 1}16 → {0, 1}16 permutation has 216 − 1 complementation properties [3].
We denote as I = (IL, IR) ∈ ({0, 1}8)2 and O = (OL, OR) ∈ ({0, 1}8)2 the input and output of the
G permutation, respectively. Then for any KR1 = (k1, k2) ∈ ({0, 1}8)2,KR2 = (k3, k4) ∈ ({0, 1}8)2
and nonzero ci = (ci,1, ci,2) ∈ ({0, 1}8)2, it has been proven that:
Theorem 1 [3]: Let KR′1 = KR1 ⊕ ci, KR′2 = KR2 ⊕ ci, O = G(KR1,KR2)(I) and O′ =
G(KR′1,KR′2)(I
′). Then I ′ = I ⊕ ci if and only if O′ = O ⊕ ci.
Corollary 1 [3]: Let KR′1 = KR1 ⊕ ci, KR′2 = KR2 ⊕ ci, O = G(KR1,KR2)(I) and O′ =
G(KR′1,KR′2)(I
′). Then I ′ 6= I ⊕ ci if and only if O′ 6= O ⊕ ci.
See Fig. 1 in Appendix A for a schematic description of the complementation properties of the G
permutation.
3.2 Flaws in Differential Analysis of Skipjack
Recall that [24] reported flaws in the differential and boomerang attacks of Skipjack made in [43].
Here, we discuss further flaws in other previous differential attacks of Skipjack made in [26]. In
[26] the differential attack has been mounted on 21, 24 and 26 rounds of Skipjack. In the 21-round
differential attack, plaintext pairs with arbitrary non-zero differences have been used, while the 24-
and 26-round differential attacks have both exploited plaintext pairs with a special difference which
induces the best differential probability for the first round. In their analysis it has been claimed
that all these plaintext pairs could extract about 216 keys in the first round alike. However, it is
not true. In fact, the number of keys which can be extracted in the first round depends only on the
probability of a first-round differential considered in the attacks. More precisely, |K1| = 232 ·p, where
K1 is a set of extracted keys in the first round and p is the probability of a first-round differential
(this property will be used in our analysis of Skipjack). It means that a plaintext difference can
determine |K1|. Therefore, in their 24- and 26-round differential attacks, |K1| is larger than 216, i.e.,
232 · 2−10.42 = 221.58 since the best one-round differential probability is 2−10.42 [3]. This fact makes
infeasible to distinguish the right key from wrong keys of the 24- and 26-round Skipjack. Hence,
their 24- and 26-round Skipjack attacks do not work.
4 Related-Key Miss-in-the-Middle Attacks on Skipjack
We exploit Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to construct 19-round related-key impossible differentials.
Theorem 1 states that given a pair of inputs, I and I ′ to G with the input difference ∆I = I⊕I ′ = a,
if I is transformed through G with the round key RK = (KR1,KR2) ∈ ({0, 1}16)2 while I ′ is
transformed through G with the round key RK ′ = (KR1 ⊕ a,KR2 ⊕ a) ∈ ({0, 1}16)2, then the
difference is preserved at the output of G, namely ∆O = O ⊕ O′ = a. Since G is a permutation,
Corollary 1 states that ∆I 6= a if and only if ∆O 6= a.
If ∆K = K ⊕ K ′ = (a, a, a, a, a) ∈ ({0, 1}16)5 and plaintext difference, ∆P = P ⊕ P ′ =
(a, 0, 0, 0) ∈ ({0, 1}16)4, then the difference after three A-rounds, where 1rA denotes one A-round
encryption, is:
(a, 0, 0, 0) 1rA→ (a, a, 0, 0) 1rA→ (a, a, a, 0) 1rA→ (a, a, a, a). (2)
Tracing the propagation of the difference through 8 B-rounds gives:
(a, a, a, a) 1rB→ (a, a, 0, a) 1rB→ (a, a, 0, 0) 1rB→ (0, a, 0, 0) 1rB→ (0, b1, a, 0)
1rB→ (0, b2, b1, a) 1rB→ (a, b3, b2, b1) 1rB→ (b1, a, c1, b2) 1rB→ (b2, b4, c2, c1). (3)
The couple {(a, 0, 0, 0), (b2, b4, c2, c1)} is a probability-one 11-round related-key differential that
states that given an input difference (a, 0, 0, 0), the output difference is always of the form (b2, b4, c2, c1)
after 3 A-rounds and 8 B-rounds, hereby denoted as 3rA||8rB .
8Now consider from the other end, a ciphertext difference, ∆C = C ⊕ C ′ = (0, a, a, d1) ∈
({0, 1}16)4. Tracing the propagation of the ciphertext difference backwards through 8 inverse A-
rounds (denoted as 8r−1A ) gives a probability-one related-key differential of the form:
(0, a, a, d1)
1r−1A→ (a, a, d1, a) 1r
−1
A→ (a, d1, a, 0) 1r
−1
A→ (d2, a, 0, d3) 1r
−1
A→ (a, 0, d3, d4)
1r−1A→ (b1, d3, d4, a) 1r
−1
A→ (d5, d4, a, d6) 1r
−1
A→ (d7, a, d6, d8) 1r
−1
A→ (a, d6, d8, d9). (4)
Theorem 2: There exists a 19-round related-key impossible differential through 3rA||8rB ||8rA of
the form {∆P,∆C} = {(a, 0, 0, 0), (0, a, a, d1)}, where ∆K = (a, a, a, a, a) ∈ ({0, 1}16)5.
Proof of Theorem 2: From Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), given∆P = (a, 0, 0, 0), then after 3rA||8rB , the differ-
ence is always of the form (b2, b4, c2, c1). However, Eq. (4) states that given ∆C = (0, a, a, d1), then
after 8r−1A , the difference is always of the form (a, d6, d8, d9). Since the first word of (b2, b4, c2, c1)
is b2 6= a but the first word of (a, d6, d8, d9) is a, then we obtain a contradiction, so a plain-
text difference, ∆P = (a, 0, 0, 0) will never cause a ciphertext difference, ∆C = (0, a, a, d1) after
3rA||8rB ||8rA. uunionsq
From the 19-round related-key impossible differential in Theorem 2, we can construct another
similar related-key impossible differential through 8rB ||8rA||3rB , from the fact that the structure
of rA is the same as that of r−1B .
Corollary 2: There exists a 19-round related-key impossible differential through 8rB ||8rA||3rB of
the form {∆P,∆C} = {(a, 0, d1, a), (0, a, 0, 0)}, where ∆K = (a, a, a, a, a) ∈ ({0, 1}16)5.
4.1 The Attacks
The 19-round related-key impossible differential in Theorem 2 can be used to mount a related-key
impossible differential attack on Skipjack reduced to 22 rounds, from the 4-th round to the 25-th
round, namely 5rA||8rB ||8rA||1rB . Essentially, we apply this related-key impossible differential to
the middle 19 rounds, namely 3rA||8rB ||8rA. Then, we extract round keys, RK4, RK5 and RK25
at the outer rounds that satisfy the impossible differential. Since the right key cannot hold the
impossible differential, the extracted round keys are wrong keys and hence discarded.
In order to induce the input difference (a, 0, 0, 0) and the output difference (0, a, a, d1) of the
19-round related-key impossible differential, we require a plaintext pair whose difference is of the
form (b1, 0, a, b2) and the corresponding ciphertext difference is of the form (d1, b3, a, a). Once we
get such a plaintext pair, we see that the input differences to G are b1 and b2 for rounds 4 and
5 which might cause a zero output difference with probability 2−16, respectively, and the input
difference to G−1 is b3 for round 25 which might cause a zero output difference6 with probability
2−16. Hence, after 2rA in the first we would get a difference (a, 0, 0, 0) with probability 2−32 and
after 1r−1B in the last a difference (0, a, a, d1) with probability 2
−16. It follows that for each desired
plaintext pair we can extract wrong key candidates by a fraction of 2−48 for round keys RK4 =
(k3, k4, k5, k6), RK5 = (k7, k8, k9, k10) and RK25 = (k7, k8, k9, k10). Our attack then follows:
1. Obtain a structure of 232 plaintext tuples, (P, P ′) such that P = (x, y, z, w) and P ′ = (x′, y, z⊕
a,w′) where x, w, x′ and w′ are all 216 possible values, and y, z are fixed constants. From
these we can form about 264 pairs such that P ⊕ P ′ = (b1, 0, a, b2), and that would satisfy
the (a, 0, 0, 0) difference after 2rA rounds with probability 2−32. Obtain 220 − 1 other such
structures of plaintext tuples by fixing the constants (y, z) to other values. Therefore, we get
about 264 × 220 = 284 such pairs with the plaintext difference (b1, 0, a, b2).
2. Obtain the encryptions of P under the key, K, and the encryptions of P ′ under K ′ = K ⊕
(a, a, a, a, a), and denote the corresponding ciphertexts by C and C ′, respectively.
6 Note that we are dealing here not only with a difference bi at the input or output of G but also a difference
(a, a) in the round key used in G. Therefore, an input or output difference, bi could also cause a zero
output or input difference. This is in contrast to analysis in [3, 4] where there was only a difference at
the input to G but no difference in the round keys.
93. For each of the 284 pairs, choose only those pairs with the ciphertext difference, C ⊕ C ′ =
(d1, b3, a, a). We expect about 284 × 2−32 = 252 pairs to remain.
4. Initialize 264 counters of keys (k3, k4, k5, k6, k7, k8, k9, k10) with 0.
5. For each of 252 remaining pairs (P, P ′) whose difference is (b1, 0, a, b2):
(a) (In round 4) ExtractRK4 which satisfy a related-key differential b1
G→ 0, and keep (k3, k4, k5,
k6, I
5
1 ) in a list, where I
5
1 is the first input value of the 5-th round computed from k3, k4, k5, k6
and P . Since the related-key differential holds with probability 2−16 on average, about 216
entries will be kept in the list. We denote this list by L1.
(b) (In round 5) For each of I51 in L1, extract RK5 which satisfy a related-key differential
b2
G→ 0. Keep in a list (k7, k8, k9, k10, I51 ) for an arbitrary fixed I51 in L1. We denote this
list by L2. Due to the complementation properties of G, L2 can cover all possible pairs
(RK5, I51 ). Since the related-key differential used in round 5 also holds with probability
2−16, about 216 entries will be kept in L2, but it covers about 216 × 216 = 232 entries.
(c) Join the two lists L1 and L2 into a list of the form (k3, k4, k5, k6, k7, k8, k9, k10, I51 ). We
denote this joint list by L3. About 216 entries will be kept in L3, but it covers 232 entries.
(d) (In round 25) For each of (k7, k8, k9, k10) in L3, check if the ciphertext pair goes to the
(0, a, a, d1) difference through the inverse of round 25. Since this is a 16-bit restriction,
about 216 (k3, k4, k5, k6, k7, k8, k9, k10) will be suggested for each plaintext pair. Increase by
1 the counters of the suggested keys.
6. For each of the 64-bit subkeys whose counters are 0, do an exhaustive search for the remaining
16 key bits using trial encryption.
Steps 1 and 2 require the encryptions of 220 structures of 233 plaintexts under the related
keys, (K,K ′). Therefore, we need 233 × 220 = 253 related-key chosen-plaintext (RK-CP) queries.
The memory complexity of this attack is dominated by Step 4, which requires 264 1-bit counters,
equivalently 261 bytes of memory. However, if we use (k3, k4) as the index of the iteration of Step 5
and we run Step 6 in Step 5, the memory complexity of this attack can be decreased down to 245
bytes of memory.
We can complete Steps 5-(a), 5-(b) and 5-(d) for each plaintext pair with 216 G computations
using the differential distribution table of F and the complementation properties of G. In Step 5-(d)
the probability that each wrong key is suggested is about 2−48, so the expectation of the number
of counters whose values are 0 is about 264(1 − 2−48)252 ≈ 240.92. It follows that Step 6 requires
240.92 × 216 × (1/2) = 255.92 22-round Skipjack encryptions on average. Hence, the overall time
complexity of this attack is about 252 × 3× 216 × (1/22) = 265.12 22-round Skipjack encryptions.7
5 Rectangle Attacks on Skipjack
In this section, we demonstrate how rectangle attacks can be mounted based only on truncated
differentials through both E0 and E1. We first give some rectangle distinguishers.
Theorem 3: There exists a 19-round rectangle distinguisher through 4rA||8rB ||7rA of the form
{α, δ} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (c2, c2, 0, 0)} with probability 2−79, where c1 and c2 are arbitrary non-zero
differences.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let E0 = 4rA||8rB and E1 = 7rA. Use a 12-round probability-one truncated
differential {α, β} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (c3, c4, c5, 0)} to cover E0, and a 7-round truncated differential
{γ, δ} = {(0, c6, c7, 0), (c2, c2, 0, 0)} to cover E1 with probability 2−16, where ci are all arbitrary
non-zero differences.
This can be used to form a rectangle distinguisher. When we have {α, β} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (c3, c4, c5,
0)} going through both E0 with probability one for the pairs (P1, P2) and (P3, P4), we then get with
7 Note that if we use a less amount of plaintext structures in this attack, the time complexity of Step
6 is increased rapidly. For instance, if we use 219 plaintext structures, Step 6 requires 267.45 22-round
Skipjack encryptions.
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probability σ ≈ 2−32 that E0(P1)⊕E0(P3) = γ1 ∈ {(0, c6, c7, 0)} = {γ}. Let β1 = (c′3, c′4, c′5, 0), β2 =
(c′′3 , c
′′
4 , c
′′
5 , 0) ∈ {β} and γ1 = (0, c′6, c′7, 0) ∈ {γ}; thus the boomerang property in the middle, i.e.
γ2 = E0(P2)⊕ E0(P4) = (E0(P1)⊕ β1)⊕ (E0(P3)⊕ β2)
= E0(P1)⊕ E0(P3)⊕ β1 ⊕ β2
= γ1 ⊕ β1 ⊕ β2
= (0, c′6, c
′
7, 0)⊕ (c′3, c′4, c′5, 0)⊕ (c′′3 , c′′4 , c′′5 , 0)
= (c′3 ⊕ c′′3 , c′6 ⊕ c′4 ⊕ c′′4 , c′7 ⊕ c′5 ⊕ c′′5 , 0) ∈ {γ}.
only if c′3 ⊕ c′′3 = 0, c′6 ⊕ c′4 ⊕ c′′4 6= 0 and c′7 ⊕ c′5 ⊕ c′′5 6= 0 with probability ρ ≈ 2−16. Thus
C1 ⊕ C3, C2 ⊕ C4 ∈ {δ} with probability (2−16)2 due to the differential (γ → δ) through E1. The
resultant probability is thus σ × (p1q1)2 × ρ ≈ 2−32 × (1× 2−16)2 × 2−16 = 2−80. This probability
can be also applied to C1 ⊕ C4, C2 ⊕ C3 ∈ {δ} and thus the 19-round rectangle distinguisher
has a probability of 2−79, compared to the probability of 2−95 that it would occur for a random
permutation. uunionsq
Similarly, there is another 19-round related-key rectangle distinguisher through the 19 rounds
4r−1B ||8r−1A ||7r−1B .
Corollary 3: There exists a 19-round rectangle distinguisher through 4r−1B ||8r−1A ||7r−1B of the form
{α, δ} = {(c1, 0, 0, 0), (c2, c2, 0, 0)} with probability 2−79, where ci are arbitrary non-zero differences.
5.1 The Attacks
The 19-round rectangle distinguisher in Theorem 3 can be used to attack Skipjack reduced to 23
rounds, from the 1-st round to the 23-th round, namely 8rA||8rB ||7rA. We apply this distinguisher
to the last 19 rounds, 4rA||8rB ||7rA, and retrieve round keys, RK1, RK2, RK3 and RK4 in the
first 4 rounds, 4rA.
To induce an input difference of the form (0, c1, 0, 0) of the 19-round rectangle distinguisher we
require a plaintext pair whose difference is of the form (c4, c3, 0, c1). Once we get such a pair, we
see in the first 4rA:
(c4, c3, 0, c1)
1rA→ (0, c1, c3, 0) 1rA→ (0, 0, c1, c3) 1rA→ (c3, 0, 0, c1) 1rA→ (0, c1, 0, 0) (5)
with a probability of approximately 2−32. This is due to the required differential conditions c4
G→ c1
and c3
G→ c1 in rounds 1 and 4, respectively. However, if we use c1 = 0||52x and c3 = c4 = f5x||0,
we can increase the probability8 of Eq. (5) up to 2−20.84, which allows us to decrease the time
complexity of the attack. It follows that for each two plaintext pairs (P1, P2) and (P3, P4) (i.e, one
quartet) such that P1 ⊕ P2 = P3 ⊕ P4 = (f5x||0, f5x||0, 0, 0||52x) we can extract the right subkeys
RK1 = (k1, k2, k3, k4), RK2 = (k5, k6, k7, k8), RK3 = (k9, k10, k1, k2) and RK4 = (k3, k4, k5, k6)
with probability 2−41.68:
1. Obtain encryptions of 261.84 plaintext pairs whose differences are all (f5x||0, f5x||0, 0, 0||52x).
From these we can form 2122.68 plaintext quartets ((P1, P2), (P3, P4)) such that P1⊕P2 = P3⊕
P4 = (f5x||0, f5x||0, 0, 0||52x). Denote the corresponding ciphertext quartets ((C1, C2), (C3, C4)).
2. Choose plaintext quartets such that C1 ⊕ C3 and C2 ⊕ C4 (or C1 ⊕ C4 and C2 ⊕ C3) are of
the form (c2, c2, 0, 0). Since it gives two 96-bit filtering conditions for each ciphertext quartet,
about 2122.68 × 2−95 = 227.68 plaintext quartets will remain after this step.
3. Initialize 280 counters of keys with 0.
4. For each of the remaining 227.68 plaintext quartets ((P1, P2), (P3, P4)):
8 In [3] it was shown that differential f5x||0 G→ 0||52x is the best possible differential of G, which holds
with probability 48/216 = 2−10.42. Besides this, there exist several other forms of best differentials of G
with the same probability.
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(a) (In round 1) Extract 232× 2−10.42 = 221.58 RK1 which satisfy a differential f5x||0 G→ 0||52x
for (P1, P2). For each of the extracted 221.58 RK1, check if (P3, P4) satisfies differential
f5x||0 G→ 0||52x. If so, keep (k1, k2, k3, k4, I21 , I ′21 ) in a list, where I21 and I ′21 are the first
16-bit input values of the second round for (P1, P2, RK1) and (P3, P4, RK1), respectively.
Since the differential holds with probability 2−10.42, about 211.16 entries will be kept in the
list. Denote this list by L1.
(b) (In round 4) For each of all possible 216 input pairs of G, (I41 , I
4
1 ⊕ f5x||0), extract 232 ×
2−10.42 = 221.58 RK4 which satisfy a differential f5x||0 G→ 0||52x. Keep in a list (k3, k4, k5, k6,
I41 ) for an arbitrary fixed I
4
1 . Denote this list by L2. Due to the complementation properties
of G, L2 can cover all possible pairs (RK4, I41 ). So 221.58 entries will be kept in L2, but it
covers 216 × 221.58 = 237.58 entries.
(c) Join the two lists L1 and L2 into a list of the form (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, I21 , I42 ), where I42
are the second 16-bit input values of the fourth round calculated by (I41 , I
4
1 ⊕ f5x||0) and
(P1, P2) (the values I ′21 in L1 are not used in this step, but they will be used in Step 4-
(e)). We denote this joint list by L3. Since L1 and L2 have two 8-bit values k3 and k4
in common, about 211.16 × 221.58 × 2−16 = 216.74 entries will be kept in L3, but it covers
216 × 216.74 = 232.74 entries due to the complementation properties of G.
(d) (In rounds 2 and 3) For each of all possible 232.74 entries in L3, encrypt the first half of
round 2 using k5, k6 and I21 and decrypt the second half of round 3 using k1, k2 and I
4
2 ,
and extract k7, k8, k9, k10 using these encrypted and decrypted values. Keep in a list all
extracted values k7, k8, k9, k10 together with k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6. We denote this list by L4.
Since each possible entry in L3 produces 216 (k7, k8, k9, k10), about 232.74 × 216 = 248.74
keys will be kept in L4.
(e) Perform Steps 4-(c) and 4-(d) for I ′21 and (P3, P4) to get L′3 and L′4. Similarly, about 248.74
keys will be kept in L′4.
(f) Increase by 1 the counters of the keys in both L4 and L′4 (note that this can be done
efficiently by sorting L4 and L′4 by k1 ∼ k6). For each plaintext quartet, about 232.74 ×
(216)2 × 2−32 = 232.74 counters of keys will be increased by 1 (note that this is computed
based on the fact that for each of 232.74 (k1, · · · , k6) in both L4 and L′4, 216 (k7, k8, k9, k10)
are suggested in each of L4 and L′4). Keep in a list keys whose counters are larger than or
equal to 2. We denote this list by K.
5. For each of the keys in K do an exhaustive search using trial encryption.
Step 1 requires the encryptions of 262.84 plaintexts, and thus we need 262.84 chosen-plaintext
(CP) queries. Step 2 requires negligible effort (it can be done efficiently by sorting ciphertexts by
the last two 16-bit values). The memory complexity of this attack is dominated by Step 3, which
requires 280 2-bit counters, equivalently 278 bytes of memory.
Step 4-(a) can be done efficiently using the differential distribution table of F , so we can complete
Step 4-(a) for each plaintext quartet with 2×216 = 217 G computations. Due to the complementation
properties of G, we can complete Step 4-(b) with a similar amount of computations as Step 4-(a),
namely, it requires 216 G computations for each pair in a plaintext quartet. Step 4-(c) can be done
efficiently by sorting the subkeys by k3, k4, so Step 4-(c) requires negligible effort. Since for each of
all possible entries in L3, 216 G computations are needed to get k7, k8, k9, k10, the time complexity of
Step 4-(d) is thus about 232.74× 216 = 248.74 G computations for each plaintext quartet. Moreover,
Step 4-(e) is the same procedure as Steps 4-(c) and 4-(d), so Step 4-(e) also requires about 248.74
G computations for each plaintext quartet. In Step 4-(f) the expectation of counter for each wrong
key is 227.68 × 232.74 × 2−80 = 2−19.58. Since the value of the counter behaves like Poisson random
variables, we estimate the number of keys in K using Poi(2−19.58). Let the counter value for a
wrong key be a variable X, then X ∼ Poi(2−19.58). Since Pr[X ≥ 2] ≈ 1− (e−2−19.58 + e−2−19.58 ×
(2−19.58)) = 2−40.16, the expected number of |K| is about 280 × 2−40.16 = 239.84 and thus the time
complexity of Step 5 is about 238.84 23-round Skipjack encryptions on average. Hence, the overall
time complexity of this attack is about 227.68 × 2 × 248.74 = 277.42 G computations, equivalently
277.42 × (1/23) = 272.9 23-round Skipjack encryptions, dominated by Steps 4-(d) and 4-(e).
The success rate of this attack is computed as follows: Recall that the last 19-round rectangle
distinguisher used in this attack has a probability of 2−79 and the first 4-round differential has
a probability of 2−20.84. Since the number of quartets used in this attack is 2122.68, the expected
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number of right quartets is 2122.68 × 2−79 × (2−20.84)2 = 4. This means that the expectation of the
counter for the right key is 4. Thus the success rate of this attack is about 90% by X ∼ Poi(4),
i.e., Pr[X ≥ 2] ≈ 0.90.
Note: In this attack we can use arbitrary nonzero differences c1, c3, c4 instead of 0||52x and f5x||0
(see Eq. (5)). This allows us to use plaintext structures to generate many pairs (and quartets)
with a small amount of plaintexts (e.g., a small amount of data complexity). As mentioned before,
however, the first 4-round differential used in the attack has a probability less than 2−20.84, (i.e.,
about 2−32), so the attack requires much time complexity. We have observed that this attack can be
done with a data complexity of 237 chosen plaintexts, a time complexity of 278.48 23-round Skipjack
encryptions and a memory complexity of 278 bytes for the same success rate.
Related-Key Rectangle Attacks on 20-Round Skipjack: Similarly, we can construct 16-
round related-key rectangle distinguishers with probability 2−111, and use them to show that the
related-key rectangle attack can be mounted on Skipjack reduced from 32 to 20 rounds. See Ap-
pendix B for more details of the attacks.
Attacks Using the Distinguishers in Corollaries: Similar attacks on other Skipjack variants
can also be mounted using the distinguishers presented in Corollaries 2, 3 and 4, requiring similar
work and text complexities.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have revisited the structure of Skipjack in terms of its resistance to the more recent advanced
differential-style distinguishers that were not considered by its designers nor in previous work on
Skipjack. In Table 2, we compare our results with previous attacks on Skipjack variants.
Our related-key attacks (i.e. related-key rectangle and related-key miss-in-the-middle attacks)
are better than all the previous related-key attacks on Skipjack.
Further, note that our boomerang-style and related-key attacks apply in symmetry, i.e. if we
have an attack on some Skipjack rounds starting with A rounds, a similar attack applies with a
corresponding version starting with B rounds (c.f. Table 2).
Table 2 also shows that for Skipjack, related-key attacks are worse than non-related-key ones
(e.g., in Differential vs RK-Differential, Rectangle vs RK-Rectangle, Impossible Differential vs RK-
MisM and Square vs RK-Square). Thus, it counter-intuitively appears that the structure of Skipjack
is more resistant to related-key distinguishers than it is to non-related-key ones. Recall that the
related-key attack model requires the stronger assumption that an attacker has access to encryp-
tion/decryption oracles under the control of two or more unknown keys that are related in some
way, thus one would expect it to perform better than non-related-key attacks.
This appears to be due to:
– the high-level structure admits good truncated differentials (used to build the infamous 24-round
impossible differential of Skipjack [4]), e.g., the bijectiveness of G allows a zero (respectively
non-zero) difference to pass through unchanged (a zero difference remains a zero difference, while
a non-zero difference remains non-zero), and zero differences do not affect other differences when
combined via XOR.
– the structure complicates the propagation of related-key differentials, e.g., the related-key dif-
ferentials that we use, exploit the invariance of a non-zero difference past G by depending on
the round keys to G having that same difference, thus cancelling out each other. However, the
invariant non-zero difference would affect other differences via XOR and thus this limits how
far it can propagate unaffected. Also, a zero difference in a related-key differential goes to an
arbitrary difference when going past G.
Our results indicate that for the case of Skipjack, related-key attacks are inferior to non-related-key
ones. We remark that it does not seem that we can construct related-key impossible differentials
longer than the non-related-key one used in [4]. With similar reasoning, related-key differential,
square, saturation and rectangle attacks would fare much worse and not get longer distinguishers
than non-related-key counterparts.
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Table 2. Comparing the Attacks on Skipjack Variants
Attack Variant Cardinality Round Types Total Rounds Texts Encryptions Memory Source
of Chosen Texts
Differential 2 8rA||8rB 16 230.5 CP 222 - [3]
Differential 2 8rA||8rB 16 217 CP 216 - [3]
Differential 2 8rB ||8rA 16 2 CP 251 - [44]
Differential 2 8rA||8rB 16 217 CP 234 - [43]
Differential 2 8rB ||8rA 16 3 CP 230 - [43]
Differential 2 4rA||8rB ||8rA||8rB† 28† 241 CP 277 - [43]
Differential 2 8rA||8rB ||5rA 21 217 CP 264 - [26]
Differential 2 8rA||8rB ||8rA†† 24†† 246 CP 272 - [26]
Differential 2 8rA||8rB ||8rA||2rB†† 26†† 246 CP 260 - [26]
Boomerang 4 4rA||8rB ||8rA||4rB† 24† 225 CP/ACC 225 - [43]
Boomerang 4 5rA||8rB ||8rA||4rB† 25† 234.5 CP/ACC 261.5 - [43]
RK-Differential 2 4rA||8rB ||2rA 14 232 RK-CP 264 - [54]
Rectangle 4 8rA||8rB ||7rA 23 262.84 CP 272.9 278 This paper
Rectangle 4 7rB ||8rA||8rB 23 262.84 CC 272.9 278 This paper
Rectangle 4 8rA||8rB ||7rA 23 237 CP 278.48 278 This paper
Rectangle 4 7rB ||8rA||8rB 23 237 CC 278.48 278 This paper
RK-Rectangle 4 8rA||8rB ||4rA 20 245.75 RK-CP 278.68 278 This paper
RK-Rectangle 4 4rB ||8rA||8rB 20 245.75 RK-CC 278.68 278 This paper
Impossible Differential 2 4rA||8rB ||8rA||5rA 25 238 CP 227 216 [4]
Impossible Differential 2 5rA||8rB ||8rA||5rA 26 238 CP 249 216 [4]
Impossible Differential 2 8rA||8rB ||8rA||7rA 31 241 CP 278 264 [4]
Impossible Differential 2 7rA||8rB ||8rA||8rA 31 234 CP 278 264 [4]
RK-MisM 2 5rA||8rB ||8rA||1rB 22 253 RK-CP 265.12 245 This paper
RK-MisM 2 1rA||8rB ||8rA||5rB 22 253 RK-CC 265.12 245 This paper
Saturation 216 4rA||8rB ||6rA 18 217 CP 244 - [27]
Saturation 216 4rA||8rB ||8rA||3rB 23 218 CP 277 - [27]
Saturation 216 8rA||8rB ||6rA 22 249 CP 244 - [27]
Saturation 216 8rA||8rB ||8rA||3rB 27 250 CP 277 - [27]
Square 216 8rA||8rB 16 218 CP 276 - [55]
Square 216 8rA||8rB ||3rA 19 218 CP 259 - [55]
Square 216 8rA||8rB ||7rA 23 218 CP 276 - [55]
Square 216 3rA||8rB ||7rA 18 218 CP 243 - [55]
Square 216 6rA||8rB ||7rA 21 218 CP 243 - [55]
RK-Square 28 8rA||1rB 9 218 RK-CP 243 - [55]
RK-Square 216 8rA||4rB 12 218 RK-CP 244 - [55]
†: as pointed out in [24], the attacks do not work.
††: as pointed out in this paper, the attacks do not work.
We emphasize that this does not imply that Skipjack has a very strong key schedule. In fact, it
is due to the key schedule that the 24-round impossible differential in [4] could be applied to attack
31 rounds of Skipjack, a major feat indeed.
Instead, our above reasonings imply that the overall diffusion structure of Skipjack is quite weak,
and design choices give rise to subtle weaknesses, e.g. a non-bijective G would not have allowed
a zero (respectively non-zero) to propagate through it unchanged. The “pluses” for the Skipjack
structure appear to be the round counters (that complicate key-schedule attacks) and the use of
different round types (A,B).
This work is hoped to shed further light into the NSA design principles of Skipjack, and its
security. We leave as open problems if better types of related-key differentials can be found for
Skipjack that use differences unlike the type we have used, and how to naturally extend existing
related-key differential attacks on other block ciphers e.g. [33, 34], via the RK-MisM technique into
related-key impossible differential attacks that cover more rounds.
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A Schematic Descriptions of Complementation Properties and Round
Functions of Skipjack
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Fig. 2. Round Functions of Skipjack
B Related-Key Rectangle Attacks on 20-Round Skipjack
It is intuitive to consider recent related-key rectangle attacks [36, 25, 9, 10] for Skipjack, since it has
a simple key schedule allowing much control over round key differences.
Theorem 4: There exists a 16-round related-key rectangle distinguisher through 4rA||8rB ||4rA of
the form {α, δ} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (0, a, a, a)} with probability 2−111, where c1 is an arbitrary nonzero
difference and ∆K = (a, a, a, a, a).
Proof of Theorem 4: Let E0 = 4rA||8rB and E1 = 4rA. Use a 12-round probability-one truncated
differential {α, β} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (c2, c3, c4, 0)} to cover E0, and 4-round probability-one related-key
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truncated differential {γ, δ} = {(a, 0, 0, 0), (0, a, a, a)} to cover E1, under two related keys (K,K ′)
with difference ∆K = (a, a, a, a, a). This can be used to form a Type 2 related-key rectangle
distinguisher [36]. When we have {α, β} = {(0, c1, 0, 0), (c2, c3, c4, 0)} going through both E0 with
probability one, we then get with probability 2−64 that E0(P1) ⊕ E0(P3) = γ = (a, 0, 0, 0), and
thus the boomerang condition in the middle, i.e. E0(P2)⊕E0(P4) = γ = (a, 0, 0, 0), will be satisfied
with probability 2−48. This allows for {γ, δ} = {(a, 0, 0, 0), (0, a, a, a)} to go through the both E1
with probability one. Furthermore, it can be also applied to (P1, P4) and (P2, P3). The resultant
probability is thus 2 × 2−64 × 2−48 = 2−111, compared to the probability of 2−127 that it would
occur for a random permutation. uunionsq
Similarly, there is another 16-round related-key rectangle distinguisher through the 16 rounds
4r−1B ||8r−1A ||4r−1B .
Corollary 4: There exists a 16-round related-key rectangle distinguisher through 4r−1B ||8r−1A ||4r−1B
of the form {α, δ} = {(c1, 0, 0, 0), (a, 0, a, a)} with probability 2−111, where c1 is an arbitrary nonzero
difference and ∆K = (a, a, a, a, a).
B.1 The Attacks
We amount a related-key rectangle attack on Skipjack reduced to 20 rounds, from the 1-st round to
the 20-th round, namely 8rA||8rB ||4rA. We apply the 16-round related-key rectangle distinguisher
in Theorem 4 to the last 16 rounds, and retrieve keys in the first 4 rounds.
This attack is very similar to the previous rectangle attack. The 16-round related-key rectangle
distinguisher has a probability of 2−111, which is much less than that of the 19-round rectangle
distinguisher in Theorem 3. The probability 2−111 does not allow us to use c1 = 0||52x and c3 =
c4 = f5x||0 in Eq. (5) (because if we use them in our attack, we cannot generate the amount of
required quartets even though we use all possible plaintexts). So we should use in Eq. (5) arbitrary
nonzero differences c1, c3 and c4. It follows that the first 4-round differential used in the attack
has a probability of 2−32, and thus the overall probability of 20 rounds is 2−111 × (2−32)2 = 2−175.
In order to get 4 right quartets, the number of required quartets in the attack should be 2177. To
collect these required quartets, we choose 244.75 plaintexts whose third 16-bit values are all same
under key K as well as choose the same amount of plaintexts whose third 16-bit values are also
same under key K⊕∆K. These form ( (244.75)22 )2 = 2177 quartets. Moreover, the number of quartets
tested in Step 4 of the previous attack algorithm is 250 because the filtering condition of Step 2
comprises 127 bits.
As stated earlier, differential c4
G→ c1 in round 1 holds with probability 2−16. It follows that in
Step 4-(a) the expectation of |L1| is one, and this step requires 250 × 217 = 267 G computations in
all. Similarly, differential c3
G→ c1 in round 4 also holds with probability 2−16, so in Step 4-(b) the
expectation of |L2| is 216(but it covers 232) and this step requires 250×216 = 266 G computations in
all. Thus the expectations of |L3| and |L4| are one(but it covers 216) and 232, respectively. From the
previous analysis, we see that Step 4-(d) and Step 4-(e) require 250× 2× 232 = 283 G computations
in all. Since the expectation of |K| is 216× (216)2×2−32 = 216, the expected counter for each wrong
key is about 250 × 216 × 2−80 = 2−14, which is almost the same as the previous one. It means that
the time complexity of Step 5 is much less than Step 4.
Hence, this attack can be done with a data complexity of 245.75 related-key chosen plaintexts, a
time complexity of 283 × (1/20) = 278.68 20-round Skipjack encryptions and a memory complexity
of 278 bytes for the same success rate 90%.
C Boomerang-Style Attacks on Block Ciphers
For a better appreciation, we chronologically list boomerang-style attacks in literature, and corre-
sponding ciphers on which they were applied.
Boomerang
1. Wagner [63], 1999: COCONUT98, Khufu-16, FEAL-6, CAST-256.
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2. Biham et al. [7], 2002: SC2000, Serpent.
3. Biryukov et al. [17], 2002: IDEA.
4. Biryukov et al. [16], 2003: SAFER++.
5. Biryukov [15], 2004: AES-128.
6. Biham et al. [9], 2005: COCONUT98, IDEA.
7. Kim et al. [37], 2008: SMS4.
Amplified Boomerang
1. Kelsey et al. [32], 2000: Serpent, MARS.
2. Kim et al. [39], 2002: SHACAL-1.
Rectangled Amplified Boomerang
1. Biham et al. [6], 2001: Serpent.
2. Biham et al. [7], 2002: SC2000, Serpent.
3. Biham et al. [8], 2003: SHACAL.
4. Lu et al. [52], 2006: SHACAL-1.
5. Lu [48], 2007: SMS4.
6. Kim et al. [37], 2008: SMS4.
7. This paper, 2009: Skipjack.
Related-Key Variants
1. Kim et al. [36] (Rectangle), 2004: SHACAL-1.
2. Kim et al. [38] (Rectangle), 2004: SHACAL-2.
3. Hong et al. [25] (Rectangle), 2005: SHACAL-1, AES-192.
4. Biham et al. [9] (Boomerang & Rectangle), 2005: AES-192, AES-256, COCONUT98, IDEA.
5. Biham et al. [10] (Rectangle), 2005: KASUMI.
6. Dunkelman et al. [22] (Rectangle), 2006: SHACAL-1.
7. Lu et al. [51] (Rectangle), 2006: SHACAL-2.
8. Lu et al. [53] (Rectangle), 2006: Cobra-F64a, Cobra-F64b.
9. Kim et al. [35] (Rectangle), 2007: AES-192, AES-256.
10. Jeong et al. [29] (Amplified Boomerang), 2007: Eagle-64, Eagle-128.
11. Wang [64] (Rectangle), 2007: SHACAL-2.
12. Lee et al. [46] (Amplified Boomerang), 2008: MISTY1, MISTY2.
13. Lee et al. [47] (Boomerang, Amplified Boomerang), 2008: DDO-64.
14. Lu and Kim [50] (Rectangle), 2008: SHACAL-2.
15. Gorski and Lucks [23] (Boomerang), 2008: AES.
16. This paper (Rectangle), 2009: Skipjack.
